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ABSTRACT: The incompleteness problem for virtue ethics is inherited by a virtue-based theory of 
argumentation as developed by Daniel Cohen (2007). A complete normative theory of argumentation 
should be able to provide reasons for why argumentative virtues such as open-mindedness are 
worthwhile, along with being able to resolve conflicts of such virtues. Adumbrating virtue-based 
argumentation theory with a pragmatic utilitarian approach constitutes a more complete theory that 
can account for why argumentative virtues are worthwhile. 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
If we derive a theory of argumentation from virtue ethics along the lines of Cohen 
(2007), then such a theory inherits what Rachels & Rachels (2010) have called the 
incompleteness problem from virtue ethics. Virtue ethics, and hence a virtue-based 
theory of argumentation, is not a complete theory for two reasons. First, a virtue-
based theory of argumentation does not provide us with a mechanism for resolving 
conflicts of argumentative virtues that does not refer to extra-virtue theoretic 
considerations (Rachels & Rachels, 2010). For example, open-mindedness to other 
views may conflict with tenacity of one’s own position. Second, a virtue-based 
theory of argumentation does not provide us with a reason for why it is good to be a 
virtuous arguer that does not appeal to considerations outside of virtue ethics such 
as pragmatic-utilitarian concerns (Rachels & Rachels, 2010).  
 The first problem may not be as serious as it appears given that many 
conflicts of virtues are really not conflicts of virtue at all, since in many 
argumentative contexts, one of the so-called virtues is, along Aristotelian lines, 
taken to a vicious extreme. For example, if one is too open-minded, then it would be 
difficult to remain tenacious with respect to one’s own view. Or if one is too 
tenacious, then there is little openness to alternative points of view. Cohen (2007) 
mentions that a “sense of proportion” is required to maintain a proper balance 
between the virtues, which is certainly consistent with an Aristotelian concept of 




And yet, tenacity, cleverness, and passionate engagement are all argumentative 
virtues right alongside open-mindedness and attentiveness. Perhaps what is really 
needed is a sense of proportion, as something of a meta-virtue, to keep them all in 
balance. (Cohen, 2007, p. 8) 
 
However, as will be shown, there are many kinds of cases where a balance between 
virtues is already present, and yet there is still a conflict where no resolution is 
forthcoming without appeal to another stance such as a pragmatic-utilitarian point 
of view or an appeal to dialectical obligations (Johnson & Blair, 1987).  
 Even if a virtue-based theory of argumentation is incomplete in this first 
sense, perhaps it at least provides us with a motive for why one should be a virtuous 
arguer. However, this is not the case. There is no component of virtue ethics that 
involves the claim that one should be virtuous, as being virtuous is not itself a virtue 
on pain of circularity. Granted, Aristotle attempted to link being virtuous with 
pleasure, so that a motive for being virtuous is that it will give rise to the right kinds 
of pleasures. But an appeal to pleasure is strictly speaking a hedonistic-
consequentialist approach. Or, one might adopt the stance that being a virtuous 
arguer is conducive to gaining insight into the nature of the world, and that the 
pursuit of knowledge is itself a virtue. However, the question that arises is why 
should we pursue knowledge. To avoid an infinite regress of virtues, we are forced 
to appeal to a pragmatic reason such as we fare better in life if we have knowledge, 
or perhaps to a deontological reason such as one ought to pursue knowledge. 
 The overall thesis that will be defended in this paper is that although a 
virtue-based theory of argumentation is worthwhile, it is not able to stand alone in 
either of the two senses mentioned above. A virtue-based theory of argumentation 
that is adumbrated with a pragmatic-utilitarian component will be developed that is 
able to overcome the incompleteness problem. Although an appeal to dialectical 
obligations is another promising approach, in the final analysis, it does not work 
given that it falls prey to the incompleteness problem with a deontological approach 
to ethics given that conflicts of duties are not resolvable without appeal to an 
external theory. 
 
2. APPARENT CONFLICTS OF ARGUMENTATIVE VIRTUES THAT ARE NOT REALLY 
CONFLICTS 
 
As alluded to above, there will be alleged clashes of virtues in argumentative 
contexts that are not really clashes owing to one of or more of the virtues being 
taken to a vicious extreme. In this type of situation, there is not a conflict of virtues, 
but rather a conflict of a virtue with a vice or a conflict between several vices. Such 
cases do not illustrate an aspect of the incompleteness problem for a virtue-based 
theory of argumentation. An example of such a clash will help drive this point home. 
 Suppose two evolutionary biologists are deeply divided on the issue of 
whether evolution is a result of mutation, natural selection, migration, and genetic 
drift (traditional theory) or whether evolution is explainable simply in terms of 
genetic drift (the “neutral” theory). The one scientist, call her Deborah, is deeply 
committed to the natural selection view of evolution, arguing for this view with 
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great tenacity, to the point where the other scientist, Ibrahim, regards Deborah as 
being somewhat dogmatic. Cohen (2007) lists tenacity as an argumentative virtue 
that presumably results in the cognitive achievement of “entitlement to one’s 
position” (Cohen, 2007, p. 6) Further, suppose the scientist, Deborah, defending this 
traditional view of evolution values keeping an open mind, even though her open-
mindedness is being hampered by her extreme tenacity..  
 On the surface, there appears to be a clash with respect to Deborah between 
two argumentative virtues, viz., tenacity and open-mindedness. However, Deborah 
has taken her tenacity to such an extreme that it hampers her ability to keep an 
open mind, which in turn diminishes the cognitive achievement of “a deepened 
appreciation of the opponent’s position” (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Further, Deborah’s 
dogmatism will preclude her from cognitively achieving the ability to abandon her 
standpoint for a potentially better one (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Taken in proper 
proportions, what is normally an argumentative virtue, viz., tenacity, has become an 
argumentative vice if we accept an Aristotelian characterization of virtue as being a 
mean between two vicious extremes.  
 The above example illustrates that apparent clashes between two 
argumentative virtues are on deeper analysis sometimes a clash between a virtue 
and a vice, or a clash between two vices. A virtue-based theory of argumentation is 
able to resolve such a conflict by labelling at least one of the alleged virtues a vice.  
 
3. REAL CONFLICTS OF ARGUMENTATIVE VIRTUES THAT REQUIRE EXTRA-VIRTUE 
THEORETIC RESOLUTIONS 
 
However, situations can arise that involve a genuine clash between two virtues, as 
will be illustrated in the following example. In this type of situation, a virtue-based 
account of argumentation does not provide a mechanism for resolving the clash 
without appealing to an external theory such as a pragmatic-utilitarian or a 
dialectical obligation approach to argumentation.  
 Expanding on the example developed above, suppose that Ibrahim like 
Deborah values both tenacity with respect to one’s position along with keeping an 
open mind. Ibrahim is committed to the neutral theory of evolution on the grounds 
that it can offer new insights into the evolution of sexual reproduction in eukaryotic 
organisms, which remains somewhat of a mystery in the context of a more 
traditional account of evolution. However, because he also values being open-
minded, he does not carry his tenacity to a vicious extreme. He is willing to concede 
to Deborah’s arguments for the traditional view, provided that they are cogent and 
closer to the truth than the neutral theory. He is even willing to completely abandon 
his own account of evolution if it does not stand up to the traditional account of 
evolution, but not to the point of simply abandoning his position without putting up 
a serious defence of his own views.  
 Ibrahim finds himself in a quandary. He feels an entitlement to his own 
position given increasing evidence in the scientific literature supporting the neutral 
theory, and yet at the same time, he values keeping an open mind and deferring to 
solid arguments that may refute his position. His tenacity with respect to his own 
position clashes with his desire to keep an open mind, which could situate him in a 
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kind of stalemate since there is no mechanism in virtue ethics that classifies one 
virtue as being more important than another virtue. If Ibrahim does attempt to 
resolve his stalemate by placing greater weight on one virtue over the other, his 
reasons for doing so will appeal to considerations outside of virtue ethics. 
 For example, Ibrahim may decide that it is more important to keep an open 
mind than to be tenacious on the grounds that this is more likely to lead to scientific 
progress. But this is a pragmatic-utilitarian consideration. Or, he may decide that it 
is more important to stick to one’s guns and defend a given position for the purpose 
of seeing what it may lead to and what its beneficial effects might be on scientific 
progress. Then once again, he is deferring to pragmatic-utilitarian reasons for 
placing greater weight on tenacity. Or, he may feel that it is his duty, his dialectical 
obligation, to defend the neutral theory with respect to other researchers working 
in that field. In that case, he is appealing to a kind of deontological reason for placing 
more weight on tenacity. 
 It could be argued that as soon as Ibrahim decides to place more weight on 
one virtue rather than another, he is carrying that virtue to its vicious extreme. 
Then, Ibrahim’s case reduces to Deborah’s case where there is now a clash between 
an argumentative virtue and an argumentative vice, so that there is no problem for a 
virtue-based account of argumentation after all. Nonetheless, the initial clash for 
Ibrahim was a clash between two of his argumentative virtues neither of which he 
had carried to a vicious extreme. Further, in deciding to place more weight on 
tenacity rather than open-mindedness, there is no reason why he needs to become 
tenacious to a vicious extreme such that it entirely precludes his open-mindedness. 
Presumably, there is a range along the continuum between two vices where a state 
of character still counts as a virtue even if it deviates slightly from the exact mean. 
What is noteworthy here is that Ibrahim’s resolution was achieved by appealing to 
considerations outside of virtue ethics.  
 
4. SPHERES OF EXPERIENCE, COGNITIVE ACHIEVEMENTS, AND WHY WE SHOULD 
BE VIRTUOUS ARGUERS 
 
Although a virtue-based theory of argumentation requires external points of view to 
resolve conflicts of argumentative virtues, perhaps it at least provides us with a 
motivation for why we should be virtuous arguers. However, as will be argued, even 
the motivation for being a virtuous arguer depends on considerations external to 
virtue ethics.  
 Taking her lead from Aristotle, Martha Nussbaum attempted to ground moral 
virtues in so-called spheres of experience that relate to any human life (Nussbaum, 
1988). For example, the virtue of courage is grounded in the universal experience of 
fear of death (Nussbaum, 1988, p. 497). The virtue of moderation is grounded in the 
universal sphere of experience relating to bodily appetites and pleasures, justice in 
the sphere of experience relating to distribution of limited resources, and so forth 
(Nussbaum, 1988, p. 497). Given that moral virtues are grounded in spheres of 
experience relating to the human condition, then there is a clear answer to the 
question of why we should be virtuous: We should be morally virtuous, because 
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virtues are grounded in universal spheres of experience relating to the human 
condition. 
 Perhaps a similar tact can be taken with respect to grounding argumentative 
virtues. Cohen (2007) outlines a number of so-called cognitive achievements that 
can be obtained from virtuous argumentation, such as a better appreciation and 
understanding of one’s own position, an appreciation of other points of view, an 
improvement of one’s own position, entitlement to one’s own position, and so forth 
(Cohen, 2007). Cohen then defines an argumentative virtue as “acquired habits of 
mind that are conducive to one of argumentation’s characteristic cognitive 
achievements” (Cohen, 2007, p. 8). Thus, open-mindedness is an argumentative 
virtue grounded in the cognitive achievement of more deeply appreciating other 
points of view. On the other hand, tenacity is an argumentative virtue grounded in 
the cognitive achievement of entitlement to one’s own position. The grounding of 
argumentative virtues in cognitive achievements seems to pave the way for an 
understanding of why we should be virtuous arguers: We should be virtuous 
arguers because this is conducive to achieving important cognitive ends that are 
universal and regarded as important by all human beings.  
 However, there is an important difference between spheres of experience 
and cognitive achievements. The former are arguably universal, and they emerge 
from the human condition, whereas the latter are not necessarily universal nor 
regarded as important by all human beings. Different individuals may well have 
opposing views as to what the cognitive achievements of argumentation are, or 
what they should be. It certainly makes more sense to ask “why should I strive for a 
deepened appreciation of another’s position?” than to ask, “why should I be afraid of 
death?” Further, the various cognitive achievements mentioned in Cohen, 2007 may 
come into conflict with one another, which brings us full circle to the charge that a 
virtue-based theory of argumentation cannot resolve conflicts of virtue. A deeper 
appreciation of another’s position may compromise one’s sense of entitlement to 
one’s own position, and so the virtue of open-mindedness grounded in the former 
may come into conflict with the virtue of tenacity grounded in the latter.  
  If argumentative virtues cannot be grounded in cognitive achievements, 
perhaps we need to revisit the Aristotelian spheres of experience. As outlined by 
Nussbaum, 1988, an additional sphere of experience is “intellectual life” (Nussbaum, 
1988, p. 497). Thus the intellectual virtues, including argumentative virtues, could 
be grounded in the sphere of intellectual life. Therefore, we should be virtuous 
arguers because it is conducive to the intellectual life. However, not everyone 
pursues or even desires the intellectual life, whereas everyone fears death and is 
concerned with bodily appetites. Someone who does not strive for the intellectual 
life will not be persuaded to be a virtuous arguer simply because it is conducive to 
the life of the mind. 
 So there appears to be no good reason, within a virtue-based theory of 
argumentation, for why we should be virtuous arguers. As with the case of resolving 
conflicts of virtues, there is cause to look outside of virtue ethics for moral 
motivation. It is not hard to find a justification for why we should be virtuous 
arguers outside of virtue ethics. For example, we should be virtuous arguers 
because it is our moral and dialectical obligation to do so. Johnson and Blair (1987) 
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argue that persons engaged in argumentation have certain dialectical obligations 
such as putting forward premises that are adequate, as well as premises that are 
relevant to the conclusion and which jointly provide sufficient support for the 
conclusion (Johnson & Blair, 1987, pp. 48 - 55). We could extend Johnson and Blair’s 
concept of dialectical obligations to include keeping an open mind, being tenacious, 
being attentive to the other’s position, and so forth. Why should one be open-
minded, tenacious, attentive, etc. as arguers? Well, because all of these are our 
dialectical obligations. However, just as a virtue-based theory of argumentation 
inherits the incompleteness problem from virtue ethics, a deontology-based theory 
of argumentation inherits the problem that there is no obvious way to resolve 
conflicts of duties without appealing to an external theory. Our duty to be open-
minded may sometimes conflict with our duty to be tenacious. As Rachels & Rachels, 
2010 point out, the inability to resolve conflicts of duties is a sore spot for any 
deontologically based theory of ethics (Rachels & Rachels, 2010, pp. 129 – 135). And 
so, we are back to the drawing board with respect to trying to find a grounding for 
argumentative virtues. 
 A much more promising external theory to ground argumentative virtues is a 
pragmatic-utilitarian approach: We should be virtuous arguers because overall, 
virtuous arguers fare better in life in terms of achieving their ends and the ends of 
their community than non-virtuous arguers. Whether or not this is really true can 
only be established empirically, although it is a promising lead. A virtue-based 
theory of argumentation adumbrated by a pragmatic-utilitarian approach will be 
sketched in the next section. 
 
5. A VIRTUE-PRAGMATIC-UTILITARIAN-BASED THEORY OF ARGUMENTATION  
 
A virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian-based theory of argumentation espouses 
argumentative virtues based on pragmatic-utilitarian grounds. Such an approach 
provides a motive for being a virtuous arguer, provided that it can be shown 
empirically that virtuous arguers generally fare better in terms of achieving their 
goals than non-virtuous arguers, and that a community of virtuous arguers is 
somehow better off (happier overall, achieves more of its goals) than a community 
of non-virtuous arguers. On this approach, an argumentative virtue can be defined 
as a moderate (between two extremes) state of character conducive to realizing 
cognitive ends that are beneficial for the arguer and the community of which they 
are a member. Further, a virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian-based approach to 
argumentation can be applied to resolving conflicts of virtues in argumentative 
contexts. One virtue may be more pragmatic to pursue than a conflicting virtue 
depending on what the arguer’s goals and preferences are, and depending on what 
the goals and preferences are of their community (scientific, philosophical, society 
at large). Thus, any such resolution to a conflict of virtues will be sensitive to the 
goals and preferences of the arguer as well as to overall utilitarian considerations 
such as what is best for the community of which one is a member. For example, if 
one is trying to secure a research grant that could advance knowledge, tenacity may 
pay off better than open-mindedness. Or, in that situation, it may turn out that being 
open-minded pays off better than tenacity. To see in more detail how the 
BRIAN MACPHERSON 
7 
adumbrated theory works in this regard, let us reconsider the example of Ibrahim 
and Deborah, the biologists on opposite sides of the fence regarding the theory of 
evolution. 
 In the example outlined above, Ibrahim is in a quandary given that he equally 
values the virtues of tenacity and open-mindedness, nor does he carry either to a 
vicious extreme. Suppose Ibrahim finds out that his research proposal for NSERC 
defending the neutral theory of evolution has a good chance of being short-listed 
since there is increased interest in the scientific community regarding the neutral 
theory. Then it may be in his best interest to pursue tenacity with respect to his own 
theory and to focus less on being open-minded with respect to defences of 
traditional evolutionary theory. If Ibrahim’s project is funded, he can employ 
graduate students to help out with the research along with bringing prestige to his 
institution, and it may advance significantly the field of evolutionary theory. As 
noted above, it could be argued that Ibrahim is deciding to carry tenacity to a vicious 
excess like Deborah, and open-mindedness to a vicious deficiency also like Deborah, 
and so the resolution to his conflict is achieved at the cost of no longer being a 
virtuous arguer. However, deciding to be tenacious with regards to one’s own 
theory does not entail that that one must carry tenacity to a vicious excess nor that 
one must carry open-mindedness to a vicious deficiency. Ibrahim, even though he 
defends his theory more seriously may still be willing to abandon his position in the 
face of serious counter-evidence if he has reason to believe that developing this 
theory may harm scientific advancement. In such a case, even though he is pursuing 
tenacity with respect to his theory, he is not carrying it to a vicious extreme, and he 
is also remaining open-minded.  
 The theory of argumentation developed in this section provides a possibility 
for resolving conflicts of virtue with respect to the same arguer. However, can the 
theory resolve conflicts of virtue between arguers? Suppose that both Deborah and 
Ibrahim are virtuous arguers, but Deborah chooses to pursue open-mindedness and 
Ibrahim decides to pursue tenacity but not to the point of vicious extremes in either 
case. A virtue-pragmatic-utilitarian approach to argumentation could at least in 
principle resolve the conflict by determining which is most beneficial to their 
community’s goals and to their own goals – Ibrahim’s pursuing tenacity or 




A workable virtue-based approach to argumentation is not a stand-alone theory 
since it cannot resolve conflicts of virtues nor does it provide a motive for being a 
virtuous arguer. However, if we add to a virtue-based theory a pragmatic-utilitarian 
decision-procedure for determining which virtues to employ in a given 
argumentative context keeping in mind the goals and purposes of the arguers, the 
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